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secured the ability not only to “leverage” 
the United States politically but also 
to command a seat at the geostrategic 
“top table�” Jones presents the Skybolt 
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of 
this nuclear-based political leverage over 
the United States� Aiming at updating 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United 
States promised delivery of the Skybolt 
system� A nuclear, standoff, air-to-
ground missile, Skybolt was designed to 
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of 
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile 
(ABM) capability� When President 
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agree-
ment in November 1962, he did so 
ostensibly on technical grounds� In truth, 
the United States opposed, on political 
grounds, any extension to the life of the 
U�K� nuclear deterrent� Seeing through 
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan 
was instrumental in resolving the crisis 
at the Nassau conference in December 
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy 
on its own petard� The United States 
was forced to concede the nature of 
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and 
instead to offer a replacement—which 
paradoxically became Britain’s second-
generation nuclear deterrent: the Polaris 
missile system� Not only had Britain’s 
first-generation deterrent not been 
curbed, but the United States in fact had 
become father to a second generation�
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of 
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold 
Wilson and the Labour Party� The 
necessity for a Polaris Improvement 
Program takes center stage in this 
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile 
was becoming obsolescent, just as the 
second-generation Polaris system was 
coming on line� There is a fascinating 
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy 
at work in the constant race to maintain 
a semblance of qualitative nuclear 
parity with the United States�
In the wake of the U�S� shift to the 
Poseidon’s advanced technology of 
the multiple independently targetable 
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under 
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin 
exploitation of an intermediate technol-
ogy, Antelope, that the United States had 
developed but later abandoned in favor 
of MIRVs� The climax of the U�K� Polaris 
Improvement Program was reached with 
Chevaline, a unique configurational 
change to alter the front end of the 
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it 
all but invulnerable to interception by 
deployed Soviet ABMs� But the history 
of that program will have to await the 
projected third volume in this series�
Meantime, Professor Jones has 
written an excellent description of 
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and 
independent strategic nuclear deterrent� 
Completely mastering his sources, 
Jones has produced a compelling work 
of lasting significance� He has come 
full circle, following in the footsteps 
of his larger-than-life role models, 
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold�
MYRON A� GREENBERG
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a 
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with 
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris 
Fussell� New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015� 290 
pages� $29�95�
During the years he spent hunting 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling 
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets 
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley 
McChrystal turned the Joint Special 
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Operations Command into a remarkably 
lethal, efficient, and effective killing 
machine� To do so he performed an 
extraordinary feat of social engineer-
ing, one that required modification of 
very insulated cultures, delegation of 
significant decision-making to very 
low levels of the organization, and 
widely sharing information in a manner 
few would have predicted possible�
Team of Teams makes it clear that this 
experience had a profound impact on 
McChrystal� In the ensuing years of 
reflection and serious study, the onetime 
four-star general has concluded that 
in a world of ever-increasing complex-
ity, networks offer the best chance for 
organizational success� The book both 
tells the story of the joint interagency 
task force and shows how modern 
leaders can achieve similar results�
McChrystal argues that technologically 
linked, extraordinarily nimble networks 
increasingly will run rings around 
organizations built around nineteenth-
century norms of hierarchy and 
efficiency� The quest for efficiency must 
give way to the pursuit of effectiveness� 
Yet speed is still a virtue, and the 
network must share vast amounts of 
information in short amounts of time� 
Accelerating the cycle of assessment, 
decision, implementation, and reassess-
ment to a pace not previously considered 
possible will enable cutting inside 
the decision loops of the competition 
and ensure victory� In positing this, 
McChrystal does not lack for boldness�
As the title suggests, McChrystal’s 
twenty-first-century organizational 
model constitutes a “team of teams�” In a 
true team, the members fully understand 
and deeply trust one another� However, 
no small team, however gifted, can 
deliver the expertise and products 
that the entire network demands� 
McChrystal’s prescription involves cross-
assigning team members, colocating 
previously isolated functions, and greatly 
increasing the sharing of information� 
Such connections are vital, for they 
build trust as well as what are described 
as organizational “neural networks�”
To his credit, McChrystal identifies 
some potential weaknesses in run-
ning such a network� For example, 
the risk of massive compromise, as 
occurred with Chelsea Manning and 
Edward Snowden, is always pres-
ent� McChrystal takes the bold and 
debatable position that the damage a 
Manning or a Snowden may cause is 
still a price worth paying, considering 
the benefits of a modern network�
With sweeping changes in organizational 
style come sweeping changes in leader-
ship� In a modern network, decision-
making is pushed down to a level where 
a leader may become uncomfortable 
with the degree of delegation� The results 
of those decisions flow to the leader, 
who, possessed of a more holistic view 
of the organization, can push informa-
tion and context back down to leaders 
far lower in the chain of command�
Questions persist about whether 
McChrystal’s model will work 
universally� A few organizations, such 
as NASA (for a time) or the Office of 
Naval Reactors, might be able to achieve 
and maintain the degree of dedication, 
reliability, and intense commitment that 
McChrystal expected and got from his 
operators, but these are rare examples�
The book does not address other 
essential aspects of organizations� How 
does a networked organization promote, 
reward, recruit, and retain its personnel? 
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How does a leader deal with a workforce 
that is increasingly transient and for 
which organizational loyalty is no longer 
a hallmark of professionalism? How are 
questions involving public relations, 
legality, and political involvement and 
interest handled? These problems are 
not unique to the military� There is no 
discussion of how leaders cope with pe-
riods of disruption, challenge, or failure�
Two other issues deserve mention� The 
first is the book’s method of citation: 
there are no footnotes or traditional end-
notes� This aids the casual reader but not 
the serious scholar, student, or executive 
who needs to delve deeper� Perhaps the 
publisher insisted on this methodology; 
if so, one hopes it is for the last time�
The other issue is more challenging� 
McChrystal goes to significant lengths 
to present Team of Teams as a collabora-
tive effort� This is commendable, and 
there may be portions of the book that 
represent a collective effort that is so 
interwoven it defies any assignment of 
individual credit� However, McChrystal 
is the only author who truly can explain 
the senior leader’s perspective and feel-
ings� As such, his voice should dominate 
the work, or at least be given clearly 
identified and dedicated portions of the 
book to provide solely his point of view�
Despite these shortcomings, Team 
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf 
devoted to modern works on leadership� 
It asks important questions, has more 
than a few sensible recommenda-
tions, and provokes useful follow-on 
conversations� Its readability also will 
be a plus for business school students, 
who increasingly will be likely to find 
it on their list of required texts�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval 
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 224 
pages� $29�95�
The average American’s view of 
naval aviation likely is informed by 
the movie Top Gun or, for those with 
some historical knowledge, the carrier 
battles of World War II in the Pacific� 
Unknown even to most naval aviators 
is a larger and equally dramatic story: 
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation 
accident rate under control� The number 
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents 
over the course of naval aviation’s history 
is staggering—in the tens of thousands, 
far more than ever were lost to combat�
A critical segment of that history 
occurred during the period that retired 
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book� 
After World War II, tectonic changes 
occurred in naval aviation, including 
the introduction of jet aircraft and 
the advent of nuclear weapons� The 
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in 
the rapidly evolving environment of the 
1950s and ’60s was intense� The need to 
fight in Korea with new and inadequate-
ly understood aircraft technology, as well 
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent 
posture day or night, in almost any 
weather, produced horrendous accident 
rates� In 1954 alone the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents, 
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers 
were killed� There was legitimate doubt 
that naval aviation would survive if that 
rate of mishaps could not be reduced�
But survive it did, through reducing 
accident rates—step by painful step� It 
is a complex, multifaceted story that 
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